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Abstract—Pricing mechanisms in the form of auctions
have been the main method for spectrum assignment
in the U.S. for over 20 years. The spectrum auctions
carried out by the Federal Communications Commission
(FCC) constitute a primary market for spectrum and
have been affected by lack of flexibility which has re-
sulted in inefficiencies in spectrum assignment, especially
in environments where spectrum is considered scarce.
In recent years, we have observed significant efforts to
increase efficiency in spectrum assignment and use. Among
those efforts is the design and adoption of secondary
markets. Secondary markets have the potential to address
inefficiencies arising in primary markets over time or those
that occur through features of auction mechanisms by
enabling spectrum to be assigned to users who value it the
most. Furthermore, liquid secondary markets have enabled
the explicit management of risk in other markets, such as
agriculture and commodities, through futures and options
trading.
In this paper, we advance the study of liquidity in
secondary markets that was begun in our previous work.
We explore (i) the reasons that may have hindered the
emergence of liquid secondary markets for radio spectrum
and (ii) what we might change to promote secondary
markets. With these objectives in mind, we study various
configurations for the design of secondary markets, which
account for the physical constraints inherent to electromag-
netic spectrum. In addition, we study technical alternatives
that would permit us to develop an appropriate, tradeable,
spectrum-related commodity. The results of our analysis
show that lack of fungibility has an adverse impact on
secondary market liquidity. To address this outcome, we
propose virtualization of spectrum resources into fungible
chunks and show that this improves market liquidity by
yielding viable market outcomes in all the scenarios we
tested.
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I. INTRODUCTION AND BACKGROUND
Over the years, a variety of approaches to efficient
and effective spectrum allocation and assignment
have been adopted. Regulation was initially insti-
tuted to avoid harmful interference among spec-
trum users. The resulting spectrum policy separates
spectrum use in space, time, and frequency (or
electrospace [1]). Thus, an applicable band plan
associates a license with a particular electrospace
and defines what services may be provided [2]. As
the importance of spectrum increases in society,
researchers and policymakers have sought ways to
increase access to and the utility of this resource
while taking the challenge of harmful interference
into consideration. Consequently, what traditionally
required a license that was obtained through an
administrative process may now be acquired through
new mechanisms: licenses may be purchased, spec-
trum may be shared by several different users,
or users may avail themselves of designated open
access, unlicensed bands.
Licenses have the economic characteristics of a
“property right”1, which led the Nobel Laureate
Ronald Coase to argue in 1959 that a pricing
mechanism should be used for resolving harmful in-
terference rather than administrative procedures [7].
He pointed out that under a proper definition and en-
forcement of property rights, the parties involved in
a dispute could bargain over the allocation of rights.
He effectively argued that markets could efficiently
assign spectrum to the highest valued uses, as they
do with many other scarce resources. In the specific
case of the U.S., the Federal Communications Com-
mission’s (FCC) approach to spectrum management
1Economically, property rights can be thought of as a social con-
struct necessitated by our desire to separate ownership and decision-
making as a consequence of economic specialization [3]. In fact, this
notion really refers to a bundle of rights [4], [5]. It is also important
to note that the “property rights” associated with spectrum allocations
relate to usage rights rather than actual ownership rights [6].
2332-7731 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TCCN.2019.2901787, IEEE
Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking
2
has evolved considerably since the 1920s. This in-
cludes the opening of unlicensed bands and the use
of auctions to assign licenses. As we have argued
elsewhere, these are some mechanisms that may be
used in the governance of a common pool resource
[4].
About 25 years ago, regulators began implement-
ing Coase’s recommendation by assigning radio
spectrum licenses through economic rather than
administrative means. Since then, many spectrum
auctions have been conducted worldwide. These
auctions are the primary markets for spectrum,
much like an initial public offering (IPO) for equity
shares. Equity owners use secondary markets for a
number of purposes, including valuing their current
holdings, adjusting their holdings through purchases
or sales, writing derivative financial instruments
(e.g. put and call options), etc.
The FCC recognized the importance of secondary
markets in their 2002 Report and Order [8] and
sought to build a framework to enable them. They
framed secondary markets not as a substitute for
spectrum auctions but rather as a means to correct
possible inefficiencies resulting from the primary
market and an alternative for carriers to respond to
changing technologies and market conditions. Thus,
secondary markets were expected to help alleviate
spectrum scarcity by making underutilized spectrum
held by current licensees readily available to new
uses and users, hence promoting the development
of novel and more spectrum efficient technologies.2
As pointed out in [6], “[w]ell functioning secondary
markets can help ensure that, as demand and supply
shift, spectrum will migrate to more efficient uses,
including those by parties outside of the initial
allocation”.
In this paper, we examine an approach for acquir-
ing spectrum usage rights through a secondary mar-
ket mechanism. Our work focuses on the complexity
of defining spectrum as a market commodity, which
calls for a thorough examination of the conditions
that would yield positive market outcomes (e.g.,
2See the statement of Professor Peter Cramton in the Secondary
Market Forum of the Federal Communications Commission. May 31,
2000.
market thickness3 and thus liquidity4). We build
upon our previous work [10], [11] to understand
the impact of non-fungible spectrum. In this way,
we use agent-based modeling (ABM) to simulate
secondary markts. We modified the ABM tool,
called SPECTRAD, to take spectrum fungiblity
into acccount through the fungibilty scores that we
previously developed in [11], [12]. To facilitate the
comparison with the previously reported work [10],
[13], we made the smallest changes possible to
SPECTRAD to implement this new functionality.
The agent-based model developed for this paper
seeks to evaluate how agents interact when they
face spectrum fungibility constraints. Additionally,
we propose a model where virtualized spectrum
commodities may alleviate the limitations imposed
by the lack of spectrum fungibility.
The remainder of our paper is organized as fol-
lows: in section II we include an overview of exist-
ing research work on the spectrum markets area and
how our research differs from these publications;
in section III we show how we adapt fungibility
considerations to spectrum markets via fungibility
scores; in section IV we explore how resource virtu-
alization may improve market liquidity, and finally,
in sections V and VI we present our conclusions and
future research directions. Specific details on our
approach to calculate fungibility scores have been
included in Appendix A.
II. RELATED WORK
Since 2002, various researchers have focused on
the development of secondary spectrum markets, at-
tending to the challenges inherent to the commodity
to trade, the market environment, and the technical
characteristics of the systems where spectrum is
utilized. In what follows we explore some of the
3An example of a thick market is the Amazon marketplace, which
has a large amount of participants who are ready to transact with one
another. Thickness results in more sellers being attracted by all the
potential buyers and more buyers coming to this marketplace due to
the increasing variety of sellers [9].
4The Palgrave Dictionary of Economics writes “A thin market
is a market with few buying or selling offers. ... A thin market
is characterized by low trading volume, high volatility, and high
bid-ask spreads ... Market thinness is a particular source of market
illiquidity. Liquidity is broadly defined as the ease of trading a
security.” http://j.mp/1pRJjHY
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existing approaches and how these differ from the
focus of our research5.
Extensive work has been published on different
types of auction mechanisms to enable dynamic
spectrum access [14]–[18]. These works, and the
citations therein, explore how various types of auc-
tions may improve efficiency in spectrum assign-
ment, allow buyers to more flexibly define the
resources they need (e.g., auctioning spectrum as
a continuous good instead of as a collection of
discrete items), and how auction mechanisms may
affect the bidding strategies of spectrum buyers as
well as the revenue perceived by spectrum hold-
ers. For instance, the authors in [15], [16] focus
on developing frameworks where truthful spectrum
auctions can be used to enable spectrum reuse.
Other proposals include the design of new auction
mechanisms that increase the diversity of the users
that obtain resources in an auction, thus exploring
the trade-off between social welfare maximization
and provision of minimum service guarantees [18].
An important research topic is the design of real-
time spectrum markets, which have been studied in
[19]–[22]. For instance, in [19], the authors explore
the development of real-time secondary markets,
where the primary license-holder is a GSM-based
cellular carrier. Their main focus is to assess how
this type of real-time trading mechanisms impacts
spectrum utilization and performance of the primary
license-holder, and whether this scheme is techni-
cally and economically viable. In [20], the study
of markets is framed within the context of cog-
nitive radio technologies. Besides real-time spec-
trum markets, the author also explores the concept
of interruptible spectrum, which seeks to enable
sharing of public sector spectrum in non-emergency
conditions. In [23], the authors compare orthogonal
(spectrum overlay) and non-orthogonal (spectrum
underlay) sharing. The first scenario involves leasing
of spectrum by a primary owner to secondary users
as exclusive but temporary rights. In the second
scenario, secondary users are allowed to transmit
in the primary user’s band and they are charged
for the interference they cause. For their analysis,
the authors consider only one primary user and one
5We do not claim that this section presents a complete survey of
the literature and we acknowledge that there are far more works that
have been developed in multiple areas of spectrum trading. In this
section we focus on the works that are relevant to different stages of
our research.
secondary user.
More comprehensive and complex network defi-
nitions that rely on spectrum trading are presented
in [24]–[26]. These works do not necessarily rely on
specific auction mechanisms; instead, they present
additional settings where the benefits of market-
based approaches can enhance spectrum utilization.
In a similar vein, in [27], the authors focus on
optimization methods to explore markets where
heterogeneous spectrum resources are leased by,
and subsequently shared among secondary users.
The authors consider a duopoly of wireless service
providers that offer spectrum in distinct frequency
bands. Secondary users opt for resources belonging
to the service provider that maximizes their utility,
which is calculated in terms of achievable link
capacity and price. In [28], the authors study a
dynamic market setting where a cognitive mobile
network operator (C-MVNO) (sub)leases spectrum
to unlicensed secondary users. The C-MVNO does
not own spectrum, instead, it obtains resources by 1)
sensing available spectrum holes and/or 2) leasing
resources from current spectrum owners. Resource
allocation from the C-MVNO to the secondary
users is modeled as a Stackelberg game, where the
cognitive operator is the leader. The objective of
the cognitive operator is to determine the optimal
amount of sensing and leasing it has to perform, and
subsequently the optimal resource price it needs to
set so as to maximize its profit. On the other hand,
secondary users seek to maximize their utility which
is a function of the required bandwidth and the price
set by the C-MVNO. In other words, secondary
users choose an amount of bandwidth depending on
the price previously set by the cognitive operator. In
both studies, [27] and [28], the price of resources
is set by spectrum lessor (to a value that maximizes
its profits); hence, secondary users cannot directly
affect the price to pay.
In terms of how different market approaches have
been tested, modeling has been a widely used mech-
anism. This is due to the lack of fully functional
secondary spectrum markets in the real world. The
objective of modeling that we are interested in con-
sists on exploring how different market participants
behave and how this influences market outcomes.
In this context, game theory has been extensively
utilized [29]–[31]. Another important method for
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modeling markets is agent-based modeling (ABM)6.
ABM has mainly been used for testing and desigin-
ing electricity markets. The work presented in [10],
[13] is, to the best of our knowledge, one of the
most thorough examples of using ABM to study
the viability of secondary spectrum markets.
Our work differs from available publications in
that we provide a throrough analysis on the fungi-
bilty of spectrum by proposing a quantitative metric
(i.e., fungibility scores) that could allow us to assess
how the lack of spectrum fungibility impacts market
viability. In computing the fungibility scores, we are
interested in finding what bandwidth or capacity, at
various frequencies, may be considered fungible or
interchangeable (e.g., of the same economic value
or perfect substitutes). Hence, we refined the initial
calculation of fungibility scores (presented in [11])
and defined a metric to compare spectrum chunks
in terms of the achievable capacity in different
bands7. Further, in our effort to define spectrum
as a tradeable commodity, we study how technical
alternatives may render the thickness that markets
need in order to be liquid. To this end, by relying
on an existing and mature technology, we propose
a model where virtualized spectrum commodities
may alleviate the limitations imposed by the lack
of spectrum fungibility.
Along these lines, the overall goal of our study
is to present alternatives that can result in viable
secondary spectrum markets. Our approach is to
increase spectrum buyers’ participation by providing
them with a quantitative metric to assess how the
resources available in the market compare to their
preferred resources. In this way, potential buyers
may be attracted to a marketplace that they would
otherwise dismiss. From the perspective of market
supply, our study also focuses on how we can
leverage existing technologies to take a step closer
toward commodifying spectrum, hence making it
possible, for a frequency band, to fit a wider array
of users and uses. In this manner, this study can be
extrapolated to other types of auction mechanism
and can be used as a basis for the design of different
secondary spectrum market models.
6ABM is a “form of computational modeling whereby a phe-
nomenon is modeled in terms of agents and their interactions.” [32].
In turn, agents are modeled with particular properties that determine
their behavior and hence their interactions in the environment [32].
7A detailed overview on how fungibility scores are calculated has
been included in Appendix A at the end of this paper.
III. INCORPORATING SPECTRUM FUNGIBILITY
LIMITATIONS TO SECONDARY MARKETS
In this work, we incorporate fungibility scores in
a trading environment to test the viability of sec-
ondary markets. We expect imperfect fungibility to
have a negative impact on the liquidity of secondary
trading markets. To assess the magnitude of this, we
include fungibility scores as a key addition to the
agent-based spectrum trading model, SPECTRAD
[10]. We have focused on the frequency dimension
of electrospace, so fungibility scores are a means to
account for spectrum heterogeneity and frequency
availability versus the specific band preferences of
a market participant.
In what follows, we describe the market char-
acteristics considered to develop a new version of
SPECTRAD that would enable us to study the
consequences of imperfect spectrum fungibility in
a synthetic market.
A. Market Model
Throughout our analysis, we compare the results
obtained with those presented in [13] to assess how
market viability is affected by limited spectrum
fungibility. Hence, we have maintained one of the
market structures studied in [13], which we briefly
detail in what follows:
1) Market Type: Using the market modeling
alternatives presented in [10], [13], we focus on
modeling a spectrum exchange with Band Manager
(BM) functionality. The BM is a broker-like en-
tity that holds, auctions and assigns the spectrum
available in the market. Hence, the BM is also in
charge of reclaiming the spectrum resources after
the lease or license transfer periods have ended. A
BM handles the process of granting authorizations
for spectrum use; however, it is not responsible for
the configuration of the radio equipment needed to
make use of the acquired spectrum. We have chosen
this market configuration as it allows us to have
a middleman that can manage available resources,
thus avoiding the overhead of direct interactions
among all market participants. Additionally, this
configuration allows us to center our attention on
the definition of spectrum as a tradeable commodity.
2) Tradeable commodity: The commodity traded
in this market is a basic (spectrum) trading unit
which is referred to as basic bandwidth unit (BBU).
2332-7731 (c) 2018 IEEE. Personal use is permitted, but republication/redistribution requires IEEE permission. See http://www.ieee.org/publications_standards/publications/rights/index.html for more information.
This article has been accepted for publication in a future issue of this journal, but has not been fully edited. Content may change prior to final publication. Citation information: DOI 10.1109/TCCN.2019.2901787, IEEE
Transactions on Cognitive Communications and Networking
5
In our model, BBUs consist of spectrum units of
200 KHz of bandwith in the 1900 MHz band.
3) Market Participants: Besides the Band Man-
ager, spectrum license requesters (SLRs) also par-
ticipate in the market. The SLRs’ objective is to
obtain a spectrum lease or license transfer to fulfill
their traffic demand. We assume that every SLR
has the infrastructure facilities to use the spectrum
resources obtained in the market. Additionally, it is
important to highlight that each SLR has a preferred
frequency for providing its services, which could
be different from the BM spectrum holdings (at the
time of purchase)8.
4) Spectrum Valuation: We focus on a model that
takes into account the consequences of the lack of
spectrum fungibility for market design and develop-
ment. For this reason, we measure an SLR’s spec-
trum valuation in terms of the difference between its
preferred capacity and the capacity obtained in the
market. Our specific approach consisted of limiting
the maximum amount that an SLR is willing to pay
for an available frequency using the corresponding
capacity fungibility score.
The original SPECTRAD model defines a re-
lationship between the amount that a user would
pay for obtaining additional spectrum in the market
and the price a user would pay for (or invest in)
an alternate technology (AT) (e.g., wireline sys-
tems, investments to improve spectrum efficiency,
unlicensed bands, etc.) that would allow them to
fulfill specific traffic requirements. The inclusion of
ATs frames the market process as part of a broader
decision process that a secondary user faces (which
has been elaborated more broadly by Cui et al. [33]).
In this context, the price of ATs essentially sets a
maximum price that a user is willing to pay for
spectrum9. SPECTRAD allows different valuations
for ATs for different users to capture the idea
that different spectrum entrants may have different
applications in mind. It is also important to note
that SPECTRAD assumed that investments in ATs
persist over several trading periods because they
8The participation of Spectrum License Holders (SLHs) is im-
plicit in our model. We expect the BM spectrum holdings to stem
from unused spectrum belonging to current incumbents i.e., SLHs.
However, at this point of our analysis, we do not model their explicit
interactions and dynamic changes in the market.
9Note that we assume that, for any given user, the performance
(i.e., capacity) that it can obtain through AT investments matches the
performance of their preferred frequency band (which may not be
the same band available in the market).
are typically associated with capital investments that
must be amortized.
The relationship between the willingness to pay
for spectrum and ATs is presented in equation (1),
where numBBUs and numATs correspond to the
number of BBUs and AT units, respectively, needed
for meeting specific traffic requirements. Limit-
PriceBBU and LimitPriceAT represent the maxi-
mum price a given user is willing to pay for BBUs
or AT units, respectively.
(numBBUs)(LimitPricePerBBU) = (numATs)(LimitPriceAT)
(1)
In turn, numBBUs and numATs are defined as
the ratio between the traffic to serve and the ca-
pacity per BBU or AT, respectively. In other words,
these represent the amount of spectrum or AT units
needed to provide a specific service.
From these expressions and definitions, it follows
that the maximum or limit price that a user will
pay for a BBU is given by (2). In this expression,
we observe that the measure of proportionality
between the maximum price to pay for spectrum,
LimitPriceBBU, and the maximum price to pay
for ATs, LimitPriceAT , is given by the ratio of the
capacity obtained with these two types of resources.
In turn, this ratio corresponds to the (capacity-
based) fungibility score we propose (3)10.
LimitPriceBBU =
capacityPerBBU
capacityPerAT
× LimitPriceAT (2)
LimitPricePerBBU = FungScore × LimitPriceAT (3)
From (3), we expect that as the capacity fungibil-
ity score decreases, so does the maximum amount
that users will pay for the spectrum available in the
market. Thus, the level of comparability between
two frequency bands drives the resource valuation,
which we set to one of three levels: low, medium
or high. These levels stem from dividing the range
of fungibility values into three equally sized sets.
The maximum price per AT unit (PAT ) also
follows three valuation levels, which are distributed
10This definition complies with our assumption that in a certain
degree, AT units and BBUs can be considered as perfect substitutes.
In this way, x BBUs provide the same level of utility (i.e., capacity)
as y AT units. This results in a linear relationship between these
two factors, which further translates in a linear relationship in the
maximum willingness to pay.
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in the range, rP, between the minimum (PATmin)
and maximum (PATmax) allowable AT prices (4),
as shown by expressions (5), (6) and (7). In this
way, users in each valuation level will be assigned
a uniformly distributed random value in the corre-
sponding range.
rP =
(PATmax − PATmin)
3
(4)
PATl = [(PATmin), (PATmin + rP)] (5)
PATm = [(PATmin + rP + 1), (PATmin + 2 × (rP))] (6)
PATh = [(PATmin + 2 × (rP) + 1), (PATmax)] (7)
Note that in this non-perfect fungibility study,
we shall allow that an SLR’s spectrum valuation is
inversely proportional to the same SLR’s valuation
of AT units. For instance, when an SLR has a low
spectrum valuation, it will be assigned AT prices
from the range belonging to PATh .
From the previous section, it is possible to obtain
a score for any pair of frequencies. For the purposes
of our analysis, we focus on a ‘worst-case’ scenario
where the SLRs have the lowest valuation for the
available spectrum (i.e., the available frequency is
1900 MHz while the SLRs’ preferred frequencies
are in the 700MHz band); hence, we used 0.3448
as the fungibility score for calculating the price
limit expressed in (3). This value corresponds to
the probabilistic fungibility score that results from
comparing the capacity obtained with 1900 MHz
and 700 MHz when both frequencies operate with
a bandwidth of 200 KHz. A detailed explanation of
this calculation is included in Apendix B2. Addi-
tionally, we have set PATmin and PATmax as 100 and
250 monetary units, respectively.
5) Market Transactions: The market transactions
in SPECTRAD are driven by sealed-bid, second-
price auctions11. In the initial bidding round, each
user will post a bid according to its own BBU and
AT valuation level (i.e., private value), as explained
in the previous subsection. If the demand is greater
11In sealed-bid, second-price auctions, the strategy of bidding one’s
highest value weakly dominates all other strategies. This stems from
the fact that “bidding your maximum value leaves you as well off as,
or better off than, bidding any other value. The amount that you bid
affects whether you win, but it does not affect how much you pay if
you win, which equals the second-highest bid” [34]. In other words,
truthful bidding dominates an overbidding stategy.
than the supply, the bids are organized in descending
order and the available resources are temporarily
assigned to the SLRs with the highest bids. The
minimum bid that temporarily receives resources is
considered as the current auction cutoff price (i.e.,
clearing price), and it is announced to all SLRs.
In this way, for each subsequent round, the SLRs
have the option to adjust their bids according to
the cutoff price in order to remain competitive in
the market. The auction ends when we have not
perceived a change in the cutoff price in the last
five bidding rounds or when we reach a (predefined)
maximum number of bidding rounds. At this point,
the SLRs with bids above the cutoff price receive
their requested resources until the BM supply is
exhausted. The SLRs that could not obtain all the
necessary spectrum units from the market will opt
for an amount of AT units that could permit them
to fulfill their traffic demand.
When the demand is not greater than the supply,
there is no competitive bidding. Hence, all bidders
receive their requested resources and they pay the
minimum cutoff price established by the BM. In this
particular scenario, it corresponds to 30 monetary
units.
B. Simulation Environment
We have maintained the agent-based simulation
environment and running considerations made in
[13]12. For market evaluation, we have considered
different combinations of spectrum users (SLRs)
and spectrum supply conditions (i.e., under supply
and oversupply). To quantify the latter, we consider
an additional parameter, R, defined in (8). In this
equation, totBBUs corresponds to the amount of
spectrum bandwidth units available in the market
and numSLRs refers to the number of market
participants in a particular scenario. In this way,
lower values of R represent spectrum undersupply
conditions, while higher values of R correspond to
spectrum oversupply.
R =
totBBUs
numSLRs
(8)
12The original and revised versions of SPECTRAD were de-
veloped in Java and they run using REPAST Simphony, an
agent-based modeling platform that works with the Eclipse
IDE. Full information on REPAST Simphony can be found in
http://repast.sourceforge.net/repast_simphony.php
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TABLE I: Simulation Parameters for the Modified
Version of SPECTRAD
Number of Market
Participants
numSLRs =
{4, 5, 6, 10, 20, 50}
Distribution of Users’
Spectrum Valuation
All users have low
spectrum valuation, which
corresponds to a high AT
valuation
Available Spectrum Calculated using (8),
where
R = {5, 10, 15, 20, 25}
Market Type Band Manager
Exchange-based market
The specific parameters that have been tested in
the new version of SPECTRAD are presented in
Table I.
C. Viability Criteria
In [13], a set of viability criteria was determined
taking into account characteristics that are desirable
for market liquidity. Unless otherwise stated, to
obtain the final values of each of these criteria, we
calculated the average of the relevant parameters
across all simulation runs.
Probability of empty bid list: The value of this
probability stems from comparing the amount of
bidding rounds where no users placed bids to the
total number of bidding rounds in a given simulation
run. High values of this criterion result from situa-
tions where the prices are too high in the market, the
resources available are not suitable for the demand
of the SLRs or the SLRs’ current AT holdings are
sufficient for fulfilling their demand. In this way, a
large number of empty bid lists implies that there
is insufficient interest in participating in the market;
thus it is an adverse condition for market viability.
Probability of demand greater than supply: This
factor allows us to compare the supply and demand
levels in the market. A positive market condition is
to have a large number of market participants opting
for a large number of market commodities, which
can actually be translated into market thickness13.
Indeed, this means that the market participants are
highly interested in the resources available. Hence,
they are willing to participate in the market to obtain
13Roth points out that thickness is related to the readily availability
of many buyers and sellers. In such a case, “[m]ore sellers will be
attracted by all those potential buyers, and more buyers will come
to this marketplace because of the ever-expanding variety of sellers”
[9].
resources to fulfill their demand. From a market
viability perspective, the higher the probability of
the demand being greater than the supply, the more
successful the market. As explained in what follows,
this criterion also has an impact in the auction cutoff
prices.
Average cutoff price: The cutoff price is a con-
sequence of the conditions of demand and supply
in the market. In fact, when the aggregate demand
from the SLRs surpasses the available supply (i.e.,
BM holdings), a competitive bidding process arises
for obtaining resources from the market. In this way,
at the end of the auction, the available resources
will be assigned to the users with the highest bids.
The minimum bid that obtained resources from the
market corresponds to the auction cutoff price14.
This further implies that the resources are assigned
to the users who value them most, thus fulfilling
one of the main objectives of auctions. On the
other hand, when the demand is not greater than
the supply, all users will be assigned resources in
exchange for the minimum payment established by
the BM (i.e., there is no competitive bidding). This
minimum payment, which becomes the final auction
cutoff price, does not reflect the SLRs valuation of
resources as this price does not stem from the SLRs
bidding activity. In this way, higher cutoff prices
indicate positive and competitive market conditions.
Average number of AT units per spectrum user:
As previously explained, a market participant in-
vests in AT units when it is not possible to obtain
enough resources from the market to fulfill its
demand. In this light, a positive market outcome
has the majority of the participants providing their
services with market commodities, thus keeping
their AT holdings low.
Percentage of assigned bandwidth units: The
calculation of this percentage allows us to compare
the amount of resources assigned in the market to
the entire market supply (i.e., the spectrum holdings
of the BM). This factor is also a consequence of
the levels of demand and supply in the market. As
such, when the demand is greater than the supply,
it is most likely that all the BM holdings will be
assigned to the most competitive SLRs; however,
when the supply exceeds the demand, it is unlikely
that the BM will assign all of its resources. In this
14Note that since we are relying on a second-price auction, the
final payment made by the auction winners corresponds to the bid
that is immediately lower to the auction cutoff price.
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way, this percentage provides us with a measure of
market efficiency in the assignment of resources and
an additional means to evaluate the degree of market
participation.
To evaluate quantitatively whether markets are
viable, we define pass and fail values for each
of the viability criteria. To this end, we observe
the simulation results for the individual viability
factors. Due to the relationship existing among these
factors, we focus on the limit values associated with
positive outcomes, and those that lead to a negative
shift in the market conditions. This allows us to
define, experimentally, pass / fail thresholds. In turn,
the scores associated with “passing” and “failing”
conditions represent how critical each factor is for
the overall viability assessment. The thresholds and
scores relevant to our market are defined in Table
II 15.
TABLE II: Viability Criteria and Market Scores
Criteria PassValue
Fail
Value
Score
Pass/Fail
P1 - Bid List
Empty < 1% ≥ 1% 1/-1
P2 - Demand
Greater than
Supply
≥ 10% < 1% 1/-1
P3 - Cutoff Price N/A < 31 0/-1
P4 - Percentage of
Assigned BBUs ≥ 62% < 62% 1/-1
P5 - Number of
ATs per User N/A ≥ 3 0/-1
D. Results
Our market viability results are derived from the
analysis of one hundred simulation runs of each
market scenario, each being active for 5000 time
ticks16. The first 3000 time ticks were used as a
warm up period, and the data for analysis was
extracted from the last 2000 time instances.
As previously stated, our analysis focused on the
‘worst-case’ scenario, thus considering each SLR
to have a low valuation of spectrum. Given that
this valuation is directly related to the fungibility
score, we performed a sensitivity analysis as a
means to validate our results and further explore
15Note that this process is the same as that followed for the
evaluation of the original version of SPECTRAD [13].
16Time ticks are the time units defined in the ABM simulation
environment. These could be replaced with any suitable time repre-
sentation.
the market behavior when the fungibility score
changes. The market viability results presented in
figure 1 contrast the following levels of spectrum
fungibility: 1 or perfect fungibility; 0.3448 or cal-
culated capacity fungibility score; 0.25 and 0.15.
The lower fungibility scores aim at considering
further constraints that could be derived from the
use of an alternative frequency, which are not only
inherent to the changes in the achievable capacity
[12]. For instance, these constraints could represent
the cost that an SLR would need to incur for using
a new type of technology that is compatible with
the frequency bands acquired in the market.
The simulation results point to the combination
of number of users and spectrum availability, ex-
pressed through R, that render viable markets. In
this way, our results show that markets are viable
when 5 ≤ R ≤ 10. We did not obtain successful
markets under spectrum oversupply conditions (i.e.,
R ≥ 15). In turn, the number of users associated
with market viability varies with the level of fun-
gibility studied. Figure 1 summarizes the market
viability scenarios we found in our simulations.
E. Discussion
Analyzing the results presented in Figure 1, we
can observe that the number of viable markets
decreases with lower fungibility scores. In fact, the
number of viable markets ranges from 9 in a perfect
fungibility scenario to 6 under lower fungibility con-
ditions. Further, as the fungibility score decreases,
not only we lose viable markets, but also, the actual
viability score associated with our positive results
diminishes.
Delving into particular viability parameters, we
explore how they change as we vary the spectrum
fungibility level. We find that the auction cutoff
price falls as the fungibility level decreases. In the
case of the percentage of BBUs that are assigned
through the market, we find that this is consistent
with demand and supply levels in the market (i.e.,
higher percentage of BBUs are assigned in higher
supply conditions); however, this parameter remains
relatively constant in spite of changes in spectrum
fungibility. A complementary parameter, the amount
of ATs assigned in the market, shows a significant
drop of as we switch from perfect fungibility to our
calculated value; however, as the fungibility level
continues to drop, this value stabilizes. These results
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Fig. 1: Average market viability scores for different levels of spectrum fungibility.
Fig. 2: Auction cutoff price when R = 10
Fig. 3: Percentage of Bandwidth units assigned
when R = 10
are portrayed in Figures 2, 3 and 4, respectively, for
the case where R is equal to 10.
It is important to note that our overall results
show that for markets to be viable, we require
at least five market participants with a moderate
Fig. 4: Average number of AT units per SLR when
R = 10
amount of spectrum available for trade. However,
if we consider the current structure of the telecom-
munications market, we can observe that in most
cases we only have a few stakeholders covering the
majority of the market. Hence, our results indicate
that it is rather unlikely that these market configu-
rations would emerge in practice.
In order to test the influence of PAT in market
viability, we tested a different scenario where PAT
follows a long-tailed distribution17. This new as-
sumption changes the range of values that users hav-
17To implement this, we assumed that the range of possible values
for PAT followed a pareto distribution and each value would occur
with the corresponding probabilities. In this way, we modified the
poportion for low, medium and high AT valuation thresholds. Note
that we still maintained our assumption that the willingness to pay
for BBUs is inversely proportional to the willingness to pay for ATs.
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TABLE III: Resulting auction cutoff prices when
PAT follows a long-tailed distribution
SLRs
4 6 10
R
5 32.8 33.6 35.5
10 31.27 31.87 32.06
15 30.4 30.43 30.27
ing a low, medium and high valuation for spectrum
and ATs can set as their price to pay. We used the
calculated fungibility score (i.e., fungibility score =
0.3448), and we still tested the worst-case scenario,
where all SLRs have a low valuation for spectrum.
All other parameters of the model followed the
description presented in Sections III-A and III-B.
Additionally, the results were evaluated using the
viability criteria detailed in Section III-C. In Figure
5, we compare the results obtained with a uniform
and long-tailed distribution of PAT . For comparison
purposes, we show the viability scores for the cases
with 4, 6 and 10 SLRs, where 5 ≤ R ≤ 15. As it can
be observed, our new results show variations in the
market viability scores; however, none of these vari-
ations imply a shift from non-viable to viable market
conditions or vice versa. In other words, changing
the distribution of the SLRs’ willingness to pay
does not necessarily impact the overall viability of
the market in our model. The results obtained also
show that the auction clearing price obeys demand
and supply conditions. As presented in Table III, in
spectrum under supply conditions (i.e., R = 5), the
cutoff price is higher in all cases. Nevertheless, the
cutoff price drops as the values of R indicate higher
supply conditions. Indeed, in the case of R = 15,
the cutoffprice presents small variations with respect
to the auction reserve price, which is 30 monetary
units.
The overall analysis performed with this new
market model led to the next step in our research.
Developing viable spectrum markets meant finding
a new, tradeable, spectrum-related commodity that
would provide greater market liquidity while fully
satisfying the requirements of spectrum buyers.
IV. FINDING THE APPROPRIATE COMMODITY TO
TRADE
The next stage of our research has focused on
finding a commodity that would increase market
thickness and liquidity, thus allowing us to create
(a) Uniform Distribution of PAT
(b) Long-tailed Distribution of PAT
Fig. 5: Comparison of Viability Scores for uniform
and long-tailed distributions of PAT
market models that would be successful in condi-
tions that resemble existing market scenarios. That
is, we require a technical means to bypass some of
the physical constraints of electromagnetic spectrum
while maintaining its capabilities for service provi-
sion. In [35], we explore the opportunities that could
be derived from wireless network and resource
virtualization and further applied to our market
scenario. Essentially, we analyze the possibility of
developing a market in which the traded commodity
is no longer “naked” spectrum, but instead, units of
virtualized spectrum. In essence, we seek a tradeable
commodity as close to the physical layer as possible
but still above it. To this end, we have framed this
virtualized market analysis within the concepts and
guidelines of LTE-Advanced. This has enabled us
to explore the degree of technical feasibility of the
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promising concepts of virtualization18.
In subsection IV-A we present some of the rel-
evant details about virtualization and LTE-A that
have been particularly useful for the development
of our new market model.
A. Technical Background
1) Wireless Network and Resource Virtualization:
Wireless Network and Resource Virtualization has
been the target of a significant amount of research
in different directions, which map to the multi-
ple layers that are involved in telecommunications
networks. From a Computer Science perspective,
virtualization is defined as “any form of partition-
ing or combining a set of network resources, and
presenting (abstracting) it to users such that each
user, through its set of partitioned or combined
resources has a unique, separate view of the net-
work” [36]. Adopting a more general point of view,
virtualization refers to the usage of a virtual version
of something rather than the actual (original) thing
itself [24]. Furthermore, we could associate the use
of virtualized resources to the use of the Cloud, in
the sense that, under virtualization, we would be
dealing with an infinite number of resources, which
are available on demand and without the need to
incur in high upfront commitments [37].
Research shows that the interpretation and appli-
cation of virtualization concepts can change accord-
ing to the area of study and the scope and depth of
the virtualization process [38]. In consequence, we
can see how the initial definition of virtualization,
in a Computer Science context19, has changed and
continues to evolve according to the specifics of the
underlying network and the goals we pursue.
Numerous applications and models of virtualiza-
tion have been studied. For the purpose of this
research, we focused on a specific virtualization
approach that contemplates the creation of resource
pools. These pools are formed through the aggre-
gation of resources belonging to multiple wireless
networks and thus operators. The pooled resources
are later made available to a larger set of operators,
18Note that our objective is to find existing technical means that
would make it possible to define homogeneous commodities, thus
creating a realistic fungibility environment. In this vein, our focus
is not to develop a technical proposal on how LTE-A PRBs may be
converted in tradeable commodities.
19For a thorough analysis of Virtualization in a Computer Science
context, please refer to [36].
who will provide a specific type of service to their
end users. As expected, these resources could be any
shareable part of the network (e.g., infrastructure,
electromagnetic spectrum); nevertheless, given that
the focus of our study comprises the development of
spectrum markets, we have considered pools formed
only by electromagnetic spectrum resources in this
stage.
Through this type of virtualization, we could
expect the rise of networks that can foster a greater
number of spectrum users due to increased oppor-
tunities for using, sharing, accessing and assigning
the existing resources [35]. In turn, operators could
obtain the required capabilities for expanding or
shrinking their networks, as needed and without
incurring in prohibitive costs [39].
In order to add thickness to the market, we
further require the pooled spectrum resources to
have a higher level of granularity and flexibility.
For this reason, we appealed to the possibilities for
resource management provided by LTE-Advanced.
By framing our virtualization approach within an
existing and mature technology such as LTE-A,
we can further bring our study closer to practical
scenarios.
2) LTE-Advanced: One of the main objectives of
the deployment and usage of LTE is the creation
of more flexible spectrum allocation mechanisms
in existing or newly available frequency bands.
Further, this technology was designed for allowing
the co-existence between current and legacy radio
technologies [40]. With its further evolution into
LTE-Advanced, we are provided with the possibility
to aggregate multiple carriers and thus obtain wider
bandwidths20. In this light, LTE represents an appro-
priate addition to the technical framework that we
require for enhancing our spectrum market model.
In LTE, the basic element for radio resource
allocation is the Physical Resource Block (PRB).
The PRBs are sets of resource elements21, which
are time-frequency resource units used for uplink
and downlink transmission. The minimum radio
resource unit that can be allocated corresponds to
one subframe of 1 millisecond, which is comprised
by two PRBs. These subframes can be aggregated
into 10 millisecond LTE-frames. In the frequency
20http://www.3gpp.org/technologies/keywords-acronyms/97-lte-
advanced
21Resource elements can be defined as one sub-carrier over one
OFDM symbol [40]
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domain, we shall remember that each PRB maps to
12 subcarriers of 15KHz each, which adds up to
180 KHz.
We can easily observe how the number of PRBs
that are allocated to a given user translate into
the bandwidth that can be utilized for a particular
transmission. The total amount of PRBs that can be
allocated to any user obeys to the LTE standard22.
For situations in which larger amounts of bandwidth
are required, we can appeal to the carrier aggrega-
tion capabilities provided by LTE-A. Under such
scheme, we can sum up to 100 MHz of bandwidth
utilizing contiguous and non-contiguous spectrum
deployments. These large bandwidths can be built
by aggregating up to five component carriers of
different individual bandwidths23. We have kept the
aforementioned characteristics of PRBs and LTE-A
parameters for downlink transmission as the basis
for the definition of the spectrum related commodity
to be traded in our market model.
B. New Market Model
For this new analysis, we have maintained the
general design and characteristics of the previous
market model. Thus, we still consider the same
type of market, market participants and market
transactions. The major change lies in the definition
of the commodity that will be traded in the market.
The new market commodity: For the new market
commodity we consider a set of virtualized spec-
trum resources which have been aggregated in a
pool. For the actual virtualization process, we take
advantage of the resource allocation process used by
LTE-A, which allows us to map PRBs to specific
values of bandwidth and in turn transform that
bandwidth into corresponding values of capacity
(in bps). We follow the standard guidelines for the
number of PRBs that can be assigned, with their
associated bandwidth and, for our trading purposes,
we calculate the resulting capacity using equations
22The reader is referred to [41] for a thorough definition of LTE-A
associated parameters and metrics.
23The added flexibility derived from the utilization of carrier
aggregation implies a technical cost, which is the result of the
fragmented nature of the spectrum, and thus bandwidth, that has been
reserved for this technology. As a consequence, we would require
the equipment and user terminals that will be handling the variable,
aggregated bandwidth to have the appropriate filtering, processing
and decoding capabilities [40], [41]. This certainly translates into
the need to develop more complex equipment, with the associated
challenges and costs.
(12) and (13). We relied on the COST 231 Walfisch-
Ikegami model to obtain the signal level applied to
equation (12). This time, the frequency parameters
for the propagation models are the applicable LTE
frequency bands and bandwidths. The remaining
parameters are still those included in Table VI.
Note that, for our market purposes, we use a 10
millisecond-LTE frame as the minimum assigned
unit.
Fungibility Conditions: LTE-A and its available
bands in the U.S. have permitted us to frame our
study within an existing fungibility environment. In
this way, for the definition of our pool of resources,
we considered three bands, of 10 MHz each, with
their center frequency in the 700 MHz range. These
approximately correspond to LTE bands 13 (746
MHz - 756 MHz), 14 (758 MHz - 768 MHz) and 17
(734 MHz - 746MHz). These pseudo perfect spec-
trum fungibility conditions are derived, in this case,
from the range similarity of these three bands and
from our assumption that LTE-A capable devices
should be able to tune to all these frequencies.
Following the original market model, we still use
the definition of alternate technology (AT), which
can be utilized by the SLRs in case they do not
obtain (sufficient) spectrum from the market. In this
particular case, we consider as an appropriate AT
option the TV White Space (TVWS) spectrum in
the 700MHz band.
C. Simulation Scenarios
We consider two different scenarios for evaluating
market viability. These scenarios evaluate different
duration periods of unlicensed spectrum (i.e., AT)
usage. Our first approach is rather conservative, as
we try to remain as close as possible to the initial
SPECTRAD model. In this way, a given user would
be able to hold these unlicensed spectrum units for
a random period that will be uniformly distributed
between 90 and 110 simulation time units24.
The second approach diverges from this random
time assignment, now assuming that the usage of
unlicensed spectrum will last the same period as
a licensed spectrum lease (i.e., 10 milliseconds).
This new interpretation permitted us to account for
24Lacking specific user data, the choice of distribution was ar-
bitrary. In practice, we could expect this distribution to be non-
linear with peaks centerd around the typical switching costs between
common ATs and spectrum BBUs.
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the possible degradation of service that users could
experience when utilizing unlicensed spectrum, as
well as their willingness to participate in the market
once a new bidding round started.
In both scenarios, the market configurations we
tested have been defined by the combination of
a given number of spectrum users (SLRs) and a
specific amount of available spectrum, using the
variable R defined in (8). Nevertheless, we further
limited the spectrum availability taking into account
our LTE-band assumption. In this way, given that
our model considers three 10 MHz LTE bands, the
spectrum pool we created could have a minimum of
18 PRBs and a maximum of 150 PRBs25.
To maintain consistency with the simulations of
previous trading models, we ran this new simulation
for 5000 time units (simulation time-ticks), from
which 3000 were considered as warm-up period and
the last 2000 provided us with the data for our
analysis. Table IV shows the relevant parameters
considered for our new model simulations.
TABLE IV: SPECTRAD Model Parameters
General Model Parameters
Bandwidth (occupied) of
the PRBs [MHz]
Values permitted by the standard:
[1.08, 2.7, 4.5, 9, 13.5, 18].
Using carrier aggregation we can
obtain up to 54 MHz.
Traffic capacity of a PRB
[Mbps]
Calculated according to the Band-
width associated to the set of PRBs
assigned, using the Shannon Ca-
pacity formula.
Min = 4.06 Mbps, Max = 15.5
Mbps
Traffic capacity of an Un-
licensed Transmission Unit
[Mbps]
1.18 Mbps - Capacity calculated
for 180 KHz of bandwidth with the
700 MHz band
PRBs lease time 10 time ticks (simulation time
units)
Unlicensed spectrum usage
time
Case 1: Uniformly distributed be-
tween 90 and 110 time ticks.
Case 2: 10 time ticks (simulation
time units)
Total simulated market
time
5000 time ticks: 3000 for warm-
up period and 2000 for active data
collection to determine the market
behavior
Spectrum User Parameters
Number of Spectrum Users Variable: 4, 5, 6, 10, 20
Mean traffic Demand 4.0 Mbps
Mean Traffic Inter-arrival
Time
Uniformly distributed between 10
and 25 time ticks
25There were cases in which the value obtained through (8) did
not match a standard-supported number of PRBs. In those situations
we utilized to the closest allowable amount of PRBs.
D. Results
The results we present take into account the
viability criteria introduced in subsection III-C.
Given that the thresholds for viability evaluation are
based on the analysis of simulation results, Table
V presents the thresholds applicable to this new
version of our model and the two scenarios we
explored.
TABLE V: Evaluation Criteria for the Viability of
the Simulated Spectrum Trading Markets
Factor Pass Fail Score
Pass/Fail
Probability of empty
bid list
= 0 > 0 1/-1
Probability that
demand is greater
than supply
≥ 10% < 1% 1/-1
Average cutoff price N/A ≤ 51 0/-1
Percentage of assigned
spectrum
≥ Average
across all
markets
< Average
across all
markets
1/-1
Average number of un-
licensed spectrum units
per SU
N/A ≥ 4 0/-1
1) Scenario 1: Our results from this first, con-
servative approach showed a slight improvement
from those presented in the original version of
SPECTRAD [13]. Nevertheless, as with the original
model, we find market viability when 5 ≤ R ≤ 15.
These values of R corresponds to situations when
there is no spectrum oversupply. Note that in the
cases where R = 10 and R = 15, the maxi-
mum number of users we tested was 10, due to
our spectrum availability assumptions. Particularly,
when R = 10, all the tested configurations resulted
in viable outcomes.
2) Scenario 2: The unlicensed spectrum usage
assumption for this scenario gave as result posi-
tive outcomes for all the market configurations we
tested. These viable outcomes included scenarios
with spectrum oversupply and under-supply condi-
tions. Evidently, this includes situations in which
there are only a few participants in the market,
which resembles more closely the current config-
uration of the telecommunications market.
E. Discussion
To evaluate the results obtained in this new ver-
sion of the trading model, we have kept in mind that
our main objective is to find a technically feasible
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Fig. 6: Comparison of the Market Viability Scores for different SPECTRAD Model Versions. This figure
shows results for relevant combinations of R and numSLR values.
alternative that would bring thickness to the market
while portraying practical market configurations. In
this light, our study does not address the technical
process that would be required to turn LTE-A PRBs
into tradeable commodities; instead, our approach
has been to use LTE-A PRBs as a proxy for
defining a fungible and tradeable spectrum-related
commodity. In figure 6, we include a comparison
of the three different models of SPECTRAD as a
means to visually evidence the changes that the
incorporation of virtualization represents for overall
market viability conditions.
Analyzing the results we obtained for our first
scenario, we observed a slight improvement over the
original SPECTRAD model. It is important to note
that the fungibility conditions we have tested this
time are more realistic, given that they are bounded
within an existing and properly functioning tech-
nology, so it is an improvement over the fungibility
constrained naked spectrum model.
In the second scenario, we found positive results
in all the tested scenarios. One particular factor
that contributes to this outcome is the fact that,
throughout our market simulations, the probability
of having an empty bid list was always equal to zero.
This is a direct consequence of the (shorter) duration
of the unlicensed spectrum usage period, which
increases the possibilities for SLRs to participate
in new bidding rounds.
To highlight the differences between Scenarios 1
and 2, in Figures 7 and 8, we show how these two
scenarios compare in terms of market efficiency. In-
deed, we can observe significant higher percentages
Fig. 7: Percentage of resources assigned in Scenario
1. Each color bar represents scenarios with 4, 5, 6,
10 and 20 SLRs where available.
Fig. 8: Percentage of resources assigned in Scenario
2. Each color bar represents scenarios with 4, 5, 6,
10 and 20 SLRs where available.
of resources assigned when SLRs have the option
of utilizing a more flexible and replaceable alternate
technology.
These results are also a consequence of adding
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thickness to the market. In fact, in this section
of our study we have focused on driving away
from a one-to-one mapping of demand and supply,
which is normally the case when naked spectrum
is traded. The creation of the pool of resources and
the further definition of the commodity to trade as
capacity, allowed us to have multiple PRBs, from
different sources being aggregated for satisfying
the requirements of a given SLR. Certainly, this
approach allowed us to scratch the surface on the
opportunities provided by resource virtualization to
enhance market viability. It should be noted that the
focus of this work has been to provide a market-
centric analysis of spectrum trading; nevertheless,
developing a marketplace for virtualized commodi-
ties requires a more comprehensive study of mar-
ket and network factors that may shift to adapt
to virtualized environments. Along these lines, a
more complex market model for trading virtualized
resources can be found in [42], [43].
To create the market model in [42], [43], we have
started by exploring suitable network configurations
and overall frameworks. In this way, our new market
model is based in network concepts initially pro-
posed by Doyle et al. in [24] and is placed within the
Institutional Analysis and Development framework
presented in [44], [45]. This has permitted us to
create a richer picture of the factors influencing
the development of the market we envision. This
process required a re-evaluation of the environment
where the market is deployed, the agents intervening
in the transactions, their actions and how these can
be used to provide feedback to the system and
hence constantly improve its operations. For in-
stance, one key addition is the inclusion of a Virtual
Network Builder, which is a middleman or broker in
charge of aggregating virtualized resources offered
by sellers to meet the demand of spectrum buyers.
We expect this middleman not only to ease the
resource assignment process; but also to establish
a trusting relationship with spectrum buyers. These
modifications of the model permitted us to enhance
our market study and shift from a market-centric
approach to an institutional approach. Evidently, this
new study required building an entirely new model,
which does not allow for a straightforward compar-
ison with SPECTRAD, hence remaining outside of
the scope of this paper.
V. CONCLUSION
This paper reports on a broader research effort
focused on studying secondary markets for radio
spectrum. These markets are necessary if we wish
to have a finer grained balance of spectrum supply
and demand, if investors in carriers want a more
realistic valuation of their spectrum assets, and
if carriers have a hope of developing spectrum-
based derivatives to help them offset their invest-
ment risk. The original work based on SPECTRAD
showed that markets could work, but were subject
to a “Goldilocks” condition (the right amount of
spectrum for the demand) and having sufficient
numbers of market participants. As we adapted the
original model to more realistic spectrum conditions
(through the mechanism of fungibility scores), these
limitations were further exacerbated, suggesting that
trading naked spectrum was not a promising way
to achieving viable secondary markets. In practice,
trading naked spectrum would be further encum-
bered by the physical infrastructure needed to de-
liver services using the traded spectrum (i.e., radios,
antennas, towers, etc.). This infrastructure may or
may not be suitable as frequency bands change.
What was (and is) needed is a different tradeable
commodity. In the absence of such a model, we
evaluated the use of PRBs in LTE as a proxy for
a tradeable commodity that would be close to the
physical layer but not bound by all of its constraints.
While this is not a true virtual commodity, it has
many of the essential characteristics that we were
looking for. When implemented, we were able to
show that trading markets in PRBs were thicker
(more liquid) than naked spectrum. Thus, secondary
markets may be viable for wireless connectivity,
even if they are not for naked spectrum.
We kept the model from [13] as our basis for
comparison throughout these models so we could
compare across the different scenarios we modeled.
That said, the outcomes of ABMs in general and
the scoring approach we used to determine mar-
ket viability in particular do not produce results
that are suitable for statistical comparative analysis.
Nonetheless, we are able to qualitatively compare
the results of the different scenarios and draw con-
clusions that are suggestive of useful strategies.
The market model we utilize has been adaptable
to different types of spectrum-related commodities,
as shown in this paper, by exploring cases where
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naked and virtualized spectrum is traded. Addition-
ally, our simulations show that SPECTRAD can
support varying numbers of participants and re-
sources available. This shows that our model scales
well to various supply and demand conditions as
well as different commodity definitions. It is also
important to note that other auction mechanisms
could be adapted to our model. Nevertheless, more
complex settings that require different definitions
of market participants and consider more compre-
hensive technical approaches may require a model
restructuring process, and this is indeed part of our
ongoing research efforts.
VI. FUTURE WORK
Our research focuses on finding an appropriate,
spectrum-derived commodity to trade in the mar-
ket and defining how we can leverage technical
advantages to increase market thickness. In turn,
this would permit us to find market viability con-
ditions that resemble those of existing telecommu-
nications markets. With this aim, we are interested
in deepening our study of more complex network
definitions that rely on the resource pooling concept.
This requires a study of the appropriate market
participants, their goals and requirements, and how
these influence the necessary market transactions.
Additionally, we are interested in exploring different
market mechanisms that may be suitable for spec-
trum trading. For instance, our future work will look
into adapting matching theory for the development
of a marketplace where spectrum buyers could ex-
press their requirements in more depth, noting that
these requirements could go beyond willingness to
pay and technical characteristics.
As part of a comprehensive spectrum markets
study, we are also committed to incorporating ad-
ditional economics, policy and governance con-
siderations that could improve the framework we
propose; hence converting it in a model that could
be successfully adopted in practice.
APPENDIX
SPECTRUM FUNGIBILITY
In this section, we discuss spectrum fungibility
and its characterization, which we use in the agent-
based simulations of the secondary spectrum mar-
kets we propose.
A. Fungibility Basics
Previous research seeking to establish the prop-
erties of electromagnetic spectrum has character-
ized it across multiple dimensions [1], [46] into
what has been referred to as electrospace. One
of these dimensions is frequency. Electromagnetic
theory shows us that two frequency bands may
have distinct properties and characteristics. From an
economic perspective, these differences mean that
two frequency bands are interchangeable only up
to a certain degree and under specific conditions.
Expressed differently, two units of electrospace
that differ in frequency are not perfect (economic)
substitutes, which represents significant limitations
for the fungibility of spectrum as an economic
commodity.26
Weiss et al. analyzed spectrum fungibility in
[11] and developed a quantitative measure for spec-
trum fungibility based on various axes in which
spectrum can vary (i.e., space, time, technology
and regulation)27. They proposed two measures of
fungibility: a distance score (Euclidean distance)
and a probabilistic score.28 The objective was to
identify a measure of similarity between two bands
that could be used by decision makers (and markets)
to estimate the comparability of bands. Equations
(9) and (10) show the general definition of these fun-
gibility scores, where d1 and f1 are the distance and
frequency parameters associated with the preferred
option, while d2 and f2 correspond to the available
options. The independent variables are scalars here,
but could be generalized to vectors for comparing
bands across multiple dimensions.
Distance Score =
max ((d1 − d2), 0)
d1
(9)
Probabilistic Score = min
(
f1
f2
, 1
)
(10)
The scores quantify the level of comparability
and substitutability between available and preferred
frequency bands, which could be used by spectrum
buyers in order to assess the measure in which a
26Note that other dimensions of electrospace (e.g., time, location,
regulations) may also create limitations on its fungibility.
27While the authors focused on the frequency dimension of elec-
trospace, this theory could apply to other dimensions as well.
28The probabilistic score is not a probability in the mathematical
sense; it rather represents the fraction of a specific characteristic (e.g.,
coverage, capacity, etc.) obtained when using an available (optional)
frequency instead of the preferred one [11].
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frequency available could match the performance of
their preferred frequency. Additionally, the scores
could be used by a seller in order to determine the
probability of success of a given transaction [11].
As the authors point out in [11], “when in-
frastructure and frequency bands can be assumed,
then service providers do not trade spectrum access
but rather for connectivity and reachability at a
particular QoS”. This supports our effort to define
additional fungibility scores that aim at comparing
spectrum-related attributes29.
B. Calculating Spectrum Fungibility Scores
In [12], we evaluated the fungibility score def-
inition presented in [11] while applying empir-
ical propagation models such as Okumura-Hata
and COST 231 Walfisch-Ikegami. These models
allowed us to take into account important physical
and environmental characteristics associated with
particular frequency bands. We studied how the
received power changes according to the parameters
considered in the different models, which permitted
us to further explore fungibility in terms of capacity
and coverage, which we explain next.
1) Coverage Fungibility Scores: One of the most
important concerns for network management and
dimensioning is the actual coverage that could
be achieved with a specific frequency, under the
conditions of the area where the system will be
deployed. To this end, we developed a coverage
fungibility score in order to provide a comparative
measure of the coverage that can be achieved with
two different frequency bands (i.e., available vs.
preferred frequency).
To calculate this score, we utilized the link budget
formula (11), where Pr is the received power, Pt is
29These fungibility scores map to the economic concept of rent.
Ricardo [47] defines rent as “the difference between the produce
obtained by the employment of two equal quantities of capital and
labor”. More generally, as expressed in ,“the economic rent of an
asset is the added value or the net return to investment, of using
that asset instead of the least efficient, or least desirable, alternative
asset available” [48]. In consequence, economic rent “represents the
additional value a producer is willing to pay to use the characteristics
and quality of an asset”. The authors further explain that it is also
expected that as the quality of the resources diminishes, the rent paid
on those resources will be reduced as well [48]. We find that the
use of fungibility scores could represent a practical means to capture
this difference between distinct frequency bands. If we further map
this to a spectrum trading environment, fungibility scores could be
utilized to find the difference between the frequency bands that are
available in the market and those that a user prefers and project this
difference to spectrum valuation.
the transmitted power, Gt and Gr are the transmitter
and receiver gains, respectively, and Lp is the path
loss.30 We worked with a specific minimum required
received power, which permitted us to calculate the
maximum allowable path loss, and thus determine
the distance (from the transmitter) associated with
this value. This distance would correspond to the
maximum cell radius, or in other words, maximum
coverage.
Pr = Pt (dBm) + Gt (dB) + Gr (dB) − Lp(dB) (11)
We built our coverage fungibility score by com-
paring the maximum coverage achieved with the
preferred frequency, f1, and the available frequency
f2. Table VI shows the parameters that we utilized
for our calculations.31
2) Capacity Fungibility Scores: The capacity
scores permit us to assess what capacity, when
calculated with different frequency bands, may
be considered fungible. To do this, we utilized
the Shannon-Hartley Information Capacity theorem
(12), which enables us to determine the maximum
rate achievable in a specific channel with a given
bandwidth and under the presence of noise.
C = B log2(1 + SNR) (12)
For the signal value, we utilized the power re-
ceived at a specific distance (i.e., fixed distance or
cell-edge), and the noise power was estimated using
(14), where F is the noise figure of the receiver, k
is the Boltzmann’s constant, T is the reference tem-
perature (290 K) and B is the applicable bandwidth.
N = FkTB (13)
= F(dB) + k(dBm/Hz/K) + T(dBm) + B(dBm) (14)
In the analysis presented in [12], the capacity fungi-
bility score was determined by comparing the capac-
ity resulting from utilizing an available frequency
(available capacity) with the capacity achievable
with the preferred frequency (reference capacity).
Note that the path-loss impacts the received power
and hence the capacity. Thus, the capacity at 1900
MHz with a given unit of bandwidth would be
30Path loss was calculated using the aforementioned empiri-
cal propagation models: Okumura-Hata and COST 231 Walfisch-
Ikegami.
31The values included in this table, and thus utilized for our
calculations, correspond to those utilized in [13] and [11]. This
permitted us to maintain those works as a measure for comparability.
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TABLE VI: Reference Parameters Utilized for the
Calculation of Fungibility Scores
Parameter Reference Value
Preferred Frequencies 700, 1000, 1500, 1700,
1900 and 2000 MHz
Available Frequency 1900 MHz
Bandwidth 200 KHz
Distance from trans-
mitter
1 Km
Transmitted Power 1mW
Minimum Required
Received Power
- 80 dBm
Base Station Height 50 m
Geographic
Environment
Medium/Small city
Mobile Antenna Height 1 m
Noise Figure 0 dB
Width of road 20 m
Building separation 40 m
Building height 15 m
Phi 90
smaller than the capacity at 700 MHz for the same
amount of bandwidth. In this way, we calculated the
available capacity (e.g., capacity obtained with 1900
MHz) considering different values of bandwidth.
The reference capacity was calculated utilizing a
fixed reference bandwidth (e.g., preferred frequency
of 700 MHz operating with 200 MHz of band-
width). For the noise power, we used (14) with
the corresponding available/preferred frequency and
applicable values of bandwidth. Finally, the signal
power was calculated using the COST 231 Walfisch-
Ikegami propagation model, while considering the
parameters shown in Table VI.
By comparing the resulting capacities, we ob-
tained probabilistic and distance fungibility scores.
We also determined what bandwidth would be re-
quired with an available frequency to match the
capacity obtained with the preferred band. We find
that the performance gap between the compared
frequencies decreases as the capacity probabilistic
score approaches 1. From this, we can determine the
bandwidth requirements for frequency substitutabil-
ity.
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